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Reviewed by Theresa Weynand Tobin
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Feminists Doing Ethics is an important collection of essays on
topics ranging from moral agency and moral reasoning, to
character and virtue, to hate crimes and humanitarian aid.
Editors Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh intend for their
volume to emphasize a fundamental insight of feminist ethics
that Margaret Walker identifies in her opening essay: rather
than viewing morality as being opposed to power many feminist
moral philosophers view morality as “inevitably, and
fundamentally,” about power (ix).1 True to the spirit in which
this volume is offered, these essays form an enlightening body
of theoretical work governed by the idea that fundamental to
the study of things moral is the study of real moral agents who
find themselves in complex relationships of power.
The view that morality is about power requires a
methodological departure from the underpinnings of traditional
moral philosophy. Accordingly, this volume begins with a
section entitled “Theory Matters.” In the first essay, Margaret
Walker proposes that by naturalizing our approach to ethics,
we can embrace a power-sensitive morality that is both
“empirically obligated and politically emancipatory” (4). One
important task for moral philosophers is to analyze the way
morality as a naturally occurring structure manifests itself in
particular communities and the various powers that must be
used to maintain it. This kind of analysis requires moral
philosophy to be interdisciplinary, which marks yet another
distinctive feature of the essays in this collection and of much
contemporary feminist moral philosophy in general. Though
most of the contributors to this collection are philosophers,
careful reflection on and integration of empirical information
from many other disciplines supports many of their respective
analyses and conclusions.
In the second essay, Uma Narayan exposes the inadequacy
of the category “Woman” for organizing feminist theoretical
and political work. Her argument stems from reflections on
the complex ways in which the interests of women who are
differently situated may not be compatible because of
disparities in power that stem from the intersection of gender,
race, class, sexual orientation, and other such factors. Narayan
challenges feminists to organize theoretical and political work
around politically chosen alliances that more accurately
represent the complexities of various forms of oppression and
that allow more of us who are politically interested to address
them. Though any essay in this book could be read discretely,
I found it extremely beneficial to read them in light of these
two opening essays as they create a methodological framework
for the remaining contributions.
One of the most cohesive sections of this volume,
“Forming Selves, Being Agents,” contains three outstanding
essays that explore the ways in which power affects identity
and moral agency. Diana Tietjens Meyers engages the debate
in contemporary feminist theory over whether or not women
have gender identities. Arguing against both essentialist views
and anti-identity views and drawing from Nancy Chodorow’s
work in psychoanalytic theory, Meyers presents a more
nuanced third alternative she calls individualized gender
identities. This third alternative acknowledges that all women
do not share the same identity as women, but allows that the
selves we are and can become depend, to some degree, on
the gendered meanings attached to the social locations that
we inhabit—in ways that we may not be able to change.
This theme is picked up by the remaining two essays in
this section. Hilde Lindemann Nelson uses rich examples from
life and fiction to demonstrate how the narrative construction
of oppressive identities can restrict one’s ability to freely
exercise moral agency. Though identities can be narratively
repaired, which can redeem one’s capacity to exercise moral
agency; if enough damage is done, repair may be limited or
impossible. Bat-Ami Bar On discusses how the formation of
her body as a violent body has been both her own project and,
as a Jewish-Israeli child in post-independence Israel, the project
of a nation (63). Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, Bar
On explores the possibility of justification for the violent female
body, carefully navigating the issue, as she recognizes that
feminists are typically suspicious and critical of violent bodies,
since violent bodies have often been the bodies of men
inflicting violence on women.
The essays in “Character and Its Virtues” extend the
discussion of moral agency using a virtue ethics lens. Lisa
Tessman argues persuasively that because oppression
functions in a structural, systemic, and targeted way, it prevents
members of certain groups from attaining certain external goods
necessary for leading a good life, and it deprives people of a
social environment conducive to the development of virtues
that facilitate human flourishing. While making a strong case
for this kind of analysis, Tessman proceeds cautiously, as she is
acutely aware of the problematic nature of characterizing the
oppressed as lacking virtue. Nancy Potter offers a context-
sensitive investigation of forgiveness. Through extended
analysis of a fictional story in which the characters’ lives are
marked by physical and sexual abuse and by oppressive
identities, Potter concludes that in some contexts, refusing to
forgive may not be a vice. Determining how to act virtuously
requires being attentive to our individual tendencies and
inclinations; but Potter cautions that “we also need to know
how structural power relations have socialized us to view
virtues and vices differently for different groups of people”
(148).
The remaining two essays in this section probe some issues
that have plagued the justice/care debate in feminist moral
philosophy. Margaret McLaren argues that placing care within
a virtue-ethics framework can solve some of the problems of
viewing care ethics as a normative moral theory, problems
such as perpetuating damaging feminine stereotypes (109).
Like McLaren, Barbara Andrew is also concerned that care
ethics upholds an ideal of the moral agent that perpetuates a
damaging feminine stereotype, one she calls the “Angel in the
House.” Seeking to free care ethics from the “Angel in the
House,” but arguing that ideals are important, Andrew suggests
an alternative moral ideal for feminist ethics, one that embodies
both autonomy and relationship: “the creator of found art and
the pursuer of erotic joy” (120). Echoing the theme that runs
throughout this volume, Andrew remarks that though all “ethics
participate in power,” not “all power limits and oppresses; some
liberates and empowers” (130). Our goal is to develop ideals
that facilitate the latter.
The fourth section of the volume, “Thinking Right, Feeling
Good,” includes two essays that explore moral reasoning or
emotions. Phyllis Rooney derives important conclusions about
moral reasoning by exploring how recent studies in feminist
psychology on sex and gender reveal situational aspects of
gender that facilitate a better understanding of situational
aspects of moral reasoning. James Lindemann Nelson then
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turns our attention to the emotions. Using literary examples
primarily from Jane Austen’s work, Nelson challenges Naomi
Scheman’s ontology of emotions—that they are entirely
socially constructed—arguing that it may undermine
Scheman’s important epistemic conclusions about the role of
emotion in achieving moral knowledge and moral objectivity.
The final section, “Taking Responsibility,” includes three
essays that tackle some applied issues. Using a feminist ethic
of care, Joan Tronto’s insightful essay reveals an alternative
way to understand and to resolve the conflicts that often arise
between professionals and managers. Natalie Brender
convincingly demonstrates that the way in which well-
intended, but politically impoverished individuals in Western
countries extend to suffering peoples in distant places is
ineffectual. She argues that our care for distant others needs
to be informed not just by “realities of need” that are made so
vivid in the visual images of the suffering in mass media, but
also by “realities of power,” which will enable us to understand
and address the causes of such suffering and not merely its
symptoms (211). In the final essay, Alison Bailey argues for an
approach to hate crimes that calls for community and not just
individual accountability. She revises Larry May’s work on shared
responsibility to create moral space for victims to participate
more fully in addressing these problems. Bailey’s “shared
respond-ability” approach preserves the moral agency of
victims, by encouraging community members not to fix
problems for victims, but to fix problems with them.
Feminists Doing Ethics is an outstanding collection of
essays by feminist scholars that can quite effectively
supplement both beginning and more advanced thinking about
morality. Perhaps one of its greatest contributions to the field
is the way these authors and editors conceive of moral
philosophy itself. As the title suggests, ethics is indeed
something that we do, and moral philosophy is better
understood as a practice rather than as a profession.  Conceiving
of moral philosophy as a practice encourages sensitivity to the
powers involved in defining, naming, educating, and
influencing, and reveals new possibilities for what moral theory
can contribute to the real world.
Endnotes
1. In their introduction, the editors also note that many of
these essays came out of an international conference on
feminist ethics, Feminist Ethics Revisited, that took place
in October 1999.
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For those of us who came of age, philosophically, when
Wittgenstein’s work was still largely the intellectual “property”
of positivist philosophers, the very idea that his work would
attract the critical attention of feminist thinkers still takes a
moment to process. However, as the two works I review here
eloquently attest, this hesitation is unwarranted. The growing
feminist literature on Wittgenstein has already begun to
underscore the deep relevance his thought has for a variety of
feminist projects; and this despite the many aspects of his
work and life that might make such an outcome seem so
highly improbable, or even “perverse.”
It is well-known, of course, that Wittgenstein’s personal
and professional lives were a maze of contradictions. His
misogyny and anti-Semitism were aspects of an ambivalent
relationship to his own sexuality born, in part, of a Victorianism
that had not yet run its course in the fin de Siecle Vienna of
Wittgenstein’s youth. His work in the Tractatus reflected a
naïve faith in the power and potential of the positivist agenda
for language and science initiated by Russell, Whitehead, and
Frege, among others. Had he taken seriously his own
pronouncements that the Tractatus laid to rest most of the
important problems confronting philosophy, his place as merely
one more of the analytical boy philosophers who provided
the impetus for the Vienna Circle would have been secure.
But the real power of his thought prevented this from
happening. His discovery that the nature of language is
intimately entangled with the cultural world in the form of
“games” and “family resemblances” would, almost from the
beginning, illuminate the inadequacies of positivist thought.
But this aspect of his work had to wait until he rejected the
atomism of the Tractatus that he did as part of the struggle
that drove him to rethink his own life and the role of philosophy
in general, two projects that would occupy him until his death.
These later elements in Wittgenstein’s thought provide much,
although not all, of the background for the material found in
Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Oppression
and Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Social
Practices and Moral Theory.
As with each of the previous volumes in the Rereading
the Canon series, Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig
Wittgenstein offers a generous selection of original essays in
which feminist philosophers engage the thought of a major
figure in the Western philosophical canon. Compiled and
edited by Naomi Scheman and Peg O’Connor, the present
anthology engenders what, for many, will be completely new
conversations in which Wittgenstein becomes a dialogical
